BlockSec Phalcon

UPDATE: Our further investigation suggests that most of the profit came from approximately 33.06B TENDRIL acquired in total for less than $10K through a liquidity position in an attacker-created V3 pool before the attack. The substantial price gap between the V3 and V2 pools BlockSec Phalcon @Phalcon_xyz Nov 5 Our system detected an attack on the TENDRIL/USDT liquidity pool on #BNB Chain hours ago, resulting in ~$556K in losses. The root cause was unsafe sell-tax logic that allowed the pool’s TENDRIL balance to be burned and its reserves synchronized before the seller’s remaining

Our system detected an attack on the TENDRIL/USDT liquidity pool on #BNB Chain hours ago, resulting in ~$556K in losses. The root cause was unsafe sell-tax logic that allowed the pool’s TENDRIL balance to be burned and its reserves synchronized before the seller’s remaining

NEAR security doesn’t often get an in-depth discussion. Drawing on our NEAR audit experience, we take a closer look at NEAR’s underlying mechanisms and how the NEAR Intents attack unfolded, then explore security considerations and best practices for project teams. Read the NEAR Intents Exploit: Refund Flaw and Security Lessons From blocksec.com

Our system detected a suspicious transaction targeting zkLink @zkLink_Official Nova, resulting in approximately $780K in losses. The root cause was flawed authentication-state verification in the Arbitrator, combined with a caller-controlled external call in the claim path. The